An incompressible idea, one whose truth would fail
An incompressible idea, one whose truth would fail if it had the power to reduce its proper manifold, is the only conceivable justification for existence.
But let’s not remain silent about the modality by which the existence of incompressible idea is reflectively given, out of fear of paradox. There is no paradox in the two diagonal slashes. By “an incompressible idea” one can only mean “the existence of an incompressible idea” and “the truth of the existence of an incompressible idea”, that is, one cannot help but rely on the highly compressed (by the standards of the multiple, though a bit discursive by reflective standards) truth of the concept-theorem that there are, relative to any existence, incompressible truths. This skirting of paradox, by which one participates in diagonalization in the approach to it – a feature, not a bug. Does this way in help to show how the hyper-one-in-intension can refer (insofar as we can speak of a reference across the duality, more in the double negative of unseparatedness, an impossibility of separation than a determinate possibility of relation) viz. a generic multiplicity?